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SESSION 2
INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN 2018—PART IV: ThE UNITED STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT: UNDERSTANDING
A PAUSE IN ThE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
PROTECTIONISM
Christopher R. yukins 
Professor of Government Procurement Law 
George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.
As the Trump administration came of age in 2018, two distinct develop-
ments marked the United States’ involvement in international procurement. 
First, to the surprise of many, and despite a wave of other U.S. protectionist 
measures aimed at strategic sectors such as steel and aluminum, the Trump 
administration did not press forward aggressively on its promised “Buy Ameri-
can” initiatives in procurement. Second, the Trump administration remained 
largely silent on an arguably protectionist initiative in the European Union, 
the European Defense Fund, which gained ground in one of the United States’ 
most important defense markets abroad. 
To address these two aspects of U.S. policy, this piece proceeds in five parts. 
Part I reviews the Trump administration’s failure to move forward on the pro-
tectionist measures President Trump called for in the early days of his admin-
istration. In Part II, the piece discusses one of the possible causes for the Trump 
administration’s reluctance to press for protectionism: a significant setback in the 
NAFTA/USMCA negotiations, which may narrow the administration’s options 
going forward. Part III reviews other potential causes for the Trump administra-
tion’s shift away from protectionism in procurement, including competing strate-
gic concerns, new U.S. data on the relatively small threat posed by procurement 
from abroad, and data from Europe which confirms that U.S. exporters have 
much to lose were the European Union to take a retaliatory stance in European 
procurement markets. Finally, Part IV reviews the European Defense Fund, an 
initiative which surged forward in 2018 and which threatens to exclude U.S. 
defense companies from important opportunities in Europe, despite reciprocal 
defense procurement agreements which guarantee open markets in defense and 
-- again surprisingly -- with no loud objections from the Trump administration. 
Part V offers concluding remarks and a potential way forward.
I. bUy AMERICAN INITIATIVE NOw MUTED IN ThE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION
At the start of the Trump administration, every indication was that the 
new president would unleash a suite of protectionist measures in procure-
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ment. Those could have included any number of measures, from higher “Buy 
American” price preferences, to tighter scrutiny of Buy American Act waiv-
ers, to protectionist measures in long-heralded legislation to rebuild public 
infrastructure in the United States. E.g., Christopher R. Yukins, The Trump 
Administration’s Policy Options in International Procurement, 2017 Gov’t 
Contracts Year in Rev. Br. 3. President Trump made a series of very public 
statements in favor of a new protectionism in federal procurement, and he 
issued Executive Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 21, 2017), which 
called for data to be gathered for an administration study, to be submitted 
in November 2017, on whether new protections might be erected around the 
federal procurement market. Id. at 18838.
That Trump administration study on new “Buy American” measures never 
materialized, and the data on Buy American waivers rest largely unnoticed 
on the Federal Business Opportunities website, www.fbo.gov. (A GAO report 
from December 2018, discussed below, offered the somewhat flat explanation 
that, according to the White House, the data posted online -- which appear to 
be data gathered under the Executive Order but never used -- allow “vendors 
selling domestic products to more easily see how agencies acquire foreign 
goods pursuant to Buy American Act exceptions.” GAO, Buy American Act: 
Actions Needed to Improve Exception and Waiver Reporting and Selected 
Agency Guidance, GAO-19-17, at 10 (Dec. 2018), https://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/700/696086.pdf.)
The question, then, is why the lull -- why has the Trump administration 
paused in pressing for new “Buy American” protections in U.S. procurement? 
There are probably several good answers (beyond the political distractions dog-
ging the Trump administration), including a surprising failure in the renegotia-
tion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a focus in negotia-
tions on opening China and other major markets, and an emerging recognition 
that -- at least at this point -- sound data suggest that it would be a mistake for 
the United States to press for aggressive barriers to the U.S. procurement market. 
The discussion below will address each of these possible explanations in turn.
II. ThE USMCA SURPRISE: NO CANADA
The first explanation for the Trump administration’s quiescence may 
have been a significant -- and surprising -- setback in the proposed replace-
ment for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).1 
In an unexpected turn, Canada ultimately refused to join Chapter 13 of the 
USMCA, which addresses procurement. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Fea-
ture Comment: The U.S-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA): Some Surpris-
ing Outcomes in Procurement, 60 Gov. Contr. ¶ 308 (Oct. 10, 2018). As Jean 
Grier noted in her blog, the “USMCA is the first U.S. free trade agreement 
(FTA) to not include procurement commitments for all parties.” Jean Heilman 
Grier, USMCA -- Modernized NAFTA: Procurement (Oct. 5, 2018), https://
trade.djaghe.com/?p=5174.
The Canadian government’s refusal to join the procurement chapter may 
have stemmed from a very aggressive posture the United States took earlier 
in the negotiations. The U.S. negotiators reportedly put forward a concept of 
strict “reciprocity” -- that the U.S. procurement market would be opened only 
to the extent that a trading partner could offer the same dollar-for-dollar ac-
cess. See, e.g., Jean Helman Grier, NAFTA Procurement: Capping Access? (Oct. 
4, 2017), https://trade.djaghe.com/?p=4351. Thus (in theory) the Canadian 
government, with perhaps roughly one tenth of the annual procurement of 
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the U.S. government, see, e.g., Government of Canada, 2016 Purchasing Activ-
ity Report, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/
reports/contracting-data/2016-purchasing-activity-report.html,would gain 
access to only one-tenth of the U.S. federal market.
This “strict reciprocity” would probably have been administratively un-
workable; over any given year, it could have meant access swinging open and 
shut to different trading partners at different times and at different levels 
in a Rube Goldberg-type scheme, badly disrupting cross-border trade and 
U.S. agencies’ ability to access best-value solutions abroad. See, e.g., Jean 
Heilman Grier, NAFTA Procurement: Capping Access, supra. Strict reciproc-
ity also could have shredded the traditional principles of comity and open 
markets that have informed U.S. trade policy in procurement since World 
War II -- the same principles that led to the WTO’s plurilateral Government 
Procurement Agreement, which now includes most industrialized nations. 
See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Erod-
ing the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l 
L. 529 (2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1002446.
Unsurprisingly, the Canadian negotiators reacted very negatively to “strict 
reciprocity,” see, e.g., Jasso, Canada’s Lead NAFTA Negotiator Criticizes U.S. 
Proposal as Freeland Heads to Washington, Globe & Mail, Feb. 13, 2018, and 
Canada ultimately simply refused to join the USMCA’s procurement chap-
ter. As a result, if the USMCA comes into effect, replacing NAFTA (an open 
question, given shifting politics in the United States), procurement trade 
between Canada and the United States instead will be governed by the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, which Canada and the United States 
joined long ago. Compared to current access under NAFTA, the GPA affords 
U.S. vendors slightly narrower access to Canadian procurement markets. See 
Jean Heilman Grier, USMCA, supra (“While U.S. suppliers will continue to 
have access to the extensive procurement that Canada covers under the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), they will lose some benefits 
accorded under the NAFTA, specifically relating to thresholds and coverage 
of services.”). In sum, despite President Trump’s claim that the USMCA was 
the “largest trade deal ever,” in procurement the agreement may have left 
U.S. businesses in a weaker place -- and it left out an entire country, Canada.
The scuffle over “strict reciprocity” under the USMCA had two collateral 
effects, both largely unforeseen. 
First, the Canadian government’s refusal to join the USMCA procurement 
chapter suddenly made it more difficult for the United States to leave the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, despite broad public speculation that 
the United States would prefer to abandon the plurilateral GPA in favor of 
bilateral arrangements in which the United States would hold more negotiat-
ing leverage. As representatives of the U.S. automotive industry noted in their 
comments on the USMCA, if “the Administration were to withdraw the U.S. 
from the WTO/GPA, which is not inconceivable, U.S. exporters would have no 
access to the Canadian government market.” Industry Trade Advisory Com-
mittee on Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods (ITAC-2), USMCA Report, 
Addendum, at 2 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agree-
ments/FTA/AdvisoryCommitteeReports/ITAC_2_REPORT-Automotive_Equip-
ment_and_Capital_Goods_Addendum.pdf. Thus, by retreating to rely solely 
on the GPA for U.S.-Canadian procurement access, the Canadian government 
significantly raised the stakes for the United States, were it to abandon the GPA.
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The second effect of the fight over “strict reciprocity” related to Mexico, 
and may spell the end of “strict reciprocity” as a negotiating tool. A paper 
published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce during the USMCA negotiations 
reported that because in practice Mexican firms seldom exercise their right to 
access U.S. public procurement under NAFTA, limiting procurement access 
across the U.S.-Mexico border in a rigidly reciprocal manner under USMCA 
could, in practice, sharply reduce U.S. firms’ existing (and much broader) 
access to Mexican public markets. See, e.g., Murphy, U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, Gutting NAFTA’s Procurement Rules Could Cost Americans Billions 
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.uschamber.com/series/modernizing-nafta/gutting-
nafta-s-procurement-rules-could-cost-americans-billions. Possibly because 
of this insight that “strict reciprocity” could in fact hurt U.S. exporters, the 
final text of the USMCA did not provide for strict reciprocity in procurement 
trade between the United States and Mexico. It is possible, too, that because 
the USMCA negotiations laid bare the potentially adverse effects of “strict 
reciprocity,” the idea has now died a quiet death.
III. ShIfTING PERSPECTIVES ON PROTECTIONISM
There may be other, less immediately tangible reasons for the lull in the 
Trump administration’s protectionism in procurement. 
The Trump administration’s policy makers working in procurement ap-
pear to have pivoted to focus on securing the U.S. industrial base, and on 
ensuring security of supply during times of conflict. A recent report to the 
Defense Department highlighted the need to ensure security of supply, not 
necessarily by excluding all foreign vendors, but instead by prudent assess-
ments of risk in the supply chain. See Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment 
of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing 
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States 
(Sept. 2018). Recent interim regulations issued by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (reviewed in John Barker’s accom-
panying piece) focus on ensuring that foreign investors cannot gain access, 
through a procurement or otherwise, to sensitive U.S. technologies. Finally, 
Section 885 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 
Public Law No. 115-232, called for new regulations to restrict foreign access 
to U.S. technologies through procurement. 
Moreover, the Administration’s broader trade policy is clearly aimed first 
at opening major markets such as China’s, for example. As the Administra-
tion’s focus shifts to opening markets, the Administration may be reluctant 
to rely too heavily on measures such as the Buy American Act, which can 
readily close a U.S. market but may be too blunt a weapon to open target 
markets abroad, at least in the near term. While the Buy American Act and 
other protectionist measures are at the heart of U.S. trade strategy under 
the Trade Agreements Act -- under the Act, the United States waives those 
protectionist measures for countries that agree to open their own procure-
ment markets -- in the near term (the timeline for a Trump administration 
focused on reelection) new protectionist measures in procurement may not 
do enough, quickly enough. New barriers to trade in procurement, such as 
sharply increased price preferences for U.S. vendors, may be too slow to force 
open specific foreign markets (such as the strategic Chinese market) or to 
protect politically sensitive U.S. sectors (such as manufacturing). 
 The data available to the Trump administration’s policy makers also 
may make protectionism in procurement seem a poor means of countering 
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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a mammoth U.S. trade deficit. A recent study by the Government Account-
ability Office, noted above, concluded that only $7.8 billion, or less than 2% 
of the approximately $500 billion in federal procurement each year, were 
attributable to foreign end products. (The study did not attempt to estimate 
the value of foreign-origin components or services.) 
The GAO study, summarized in the chart above, found that of $508 bil-
lion in procurement (much of which were in services), $196 billion were in 
end products that could be subject to the Buy American Act. Of those, only 
$7.8 billion (4% of all end products purchased, and 1.5% of all procurement 
in FY2017) were end products of foreign origin. (The GAO report also found 
that these data were generally consistent with prior years’ data.) Of the $7.8 
billion in foreign end products, roughly half were for use outside the United 
States (and thus exempt from the Buy American Act), approximately a third 
were from “qualifying countries” (i.e., subject to reciprocal defense procure-
ment agreements, discussed below), and only $550 million (roughly .1% of 
all procurement) were admitted under trade agreements. In practical terms, 
this meant:
•	 Overall,	foreign-source	supplies	are	only	a	very	small	part	of	U.S.	
procurement, and eliminating them entirely -- by barring federal 
agencies from using any foreign goods in the United States, for 
example -- would cover only roughly $4 billion in goods and thus 
would have no discernible impact on the overall U.S. trade deficit 
(which in 2017 was $566 billion), and could compromise U.S. agen-
cies’ abilities to achieve their missions when foreign goods provide 
the best value.
•	 Dismantling	free	trade	agreements,	such	as	the	GPA,	likely	would	
have only a tiny effect in increasing federal agencies’ purchases 
of U.S.-made goods.
•	 Reciprocal	defense	procurement	agreements	--	as	noted	below,	a	
cornerstone to open defense trade -- played a much more impor-
tant role than traditional free trade agreements in opening U.S. 
procurement markets.
Notably the GAO study did not attempt to assess the impact that new 
protectionist measures might have on U.S. exporters’ access to foreign procure-
ment markets. The GAO study showed, for example, that European nations 
are leading sources of the foreign end products purchased by federal agencies, 
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id. at 41, but did not assess what impact new protectionist measures might 
have on U.S. exporters, were (for example) the European Union to retaliate 
against U.S. protectionism. 
Data published by the European Commission on larger, reported awards 
suggest that U.S. exporters have very favorable access to European procure-
ment markets, both in direct sales and in indirect sales (through European 
entities). See European Commission, Measurement of Impact of Cross-Border 
Penetration in Public Procurement (Feb. 2017), https://publications.europa.eu/
en/publication-detail/-/publication/5c148423-39e2-11e7-a08e-01aa75ed71a1/
language-en. The European Commission’s data show that the United States 
is consistently the leading non-EU exporter to the European Union’s procure-
ment markets, in both direct and indirect procurement sales, and in both 
numbers of contract actions and value. Id. at 41 & 43. The Commission’s data, 
id. at 48, also show that U.S. companies win 3.8% of all the direct awards 
studied (a figure which compares favorably to all foreign end products awards 
in the U.S. system (see above)), and fully 21.8 % of all indirect awards (i.e., 
awards through European subsidiaries), id. at 49. While the finer points of 
the European Commission’s data have been contested by U.S. officials, the 
data at least indicate that U.S. companies have a strong foothold in European 
public procurement markets -- a market position that could be imperiled were 
U.S. protectionism to trigger European retaliation.
There is another type of economic analysis just over the horizon: economet-
ric analyses of the broader, economy-wide impacts of protectionist measures. 
These econometric studies do not yet shape the public debate, but are likely to 
become much more relevant to policy assessments. The European Commission 
is spending millions of Euros constructing a database which will allow policy 
makers to analyze, in stark empirical terms, the direct and indirect costs of new 
barriers to procurement trade. See generally Lucian Cernat & Zornitsa Kutlina-
Dimitrova, International Public Procurement: From Scant Facts to Hard Data, 
DG TRADE Chief Economist Notes 2015-1 (Directorate General for Trade, Eu-
ropean Commission), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/dgtcen/2015_001.html. Many 
of the costs of protectionism, such as efficient supply chains disrupted by inef-
ficient preferences, traditionally have been too obscure to capture or measure; 
the European Commission’s initiative aims to remedy that. The Commission’s 
initiative builds on an earlier study at Victoria University (Australia), which 
drew on econometric data regularly used by U.S. agencies to conclude that the 
“Buy America” preferences in U.S. law (preferences which go, for example, to 
federally funded transportation procurement) cost hundreds of thousands of 
lost U.S. jobs. See Peter B. Dixon, Maureen T. Rimmer & Robert G. Waschik, 
Macro, Industry and Regional Effects of Buy America(n) Programs: USAGE 
Simulations, Victoria University, Melbourne Centre of Policy Studies Working 
Paper No. G-271 (April 2017), http://www.copsmodels.com/ftp/workpapr/g-271.
pdf. These types of probing econometric studies may well reshape how policy 
makers think about protectionism in procurement for decades to come. 
All of the foregoing help explain why the Trump administration has 
seemed to pivot in its approach to protectionism in procurement, to step 
back from an early emphasis on “Buy American” measures. What they do 
not explain, however, is why the Trump administration has remained largely 
acquiescent in an important new initiative in the European Union, the Euro-
pean Defense Fund, which threatens to undermine U.S. market dominance 
in defense and appears to contradict longstanding reciprocal agreements to 
open defense markets on either side of the Atlantic. 
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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IV. EUROPEAN DEfENSE fUND MOVES fORwARD, wIThOUT 
REAL RESISTANCE
The European Defense Fund, originally launched in 2016, advanced 
markedly in 2018, and in December 2018 the European Parliament approved 
billions of Euros in new funding. See European Parliament Votes to Give EUR 
13 Billion Subsidy to Arms Companies via European Defence Fund, Targeted 
News Serv., Dec. 13, 2018 (available on Westlaw). The European Development 
Fund would provide support for joint efforts among European defense firms 
to develop and produce defense materiel. Under a European regulation put 
forth in 2018, no support would be available for firms based, or run by those, 
outside the European Union. See Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: 
European Commission Proposes Expanding The European Defence Fund—A 
Major Potential Barrier To Transatlantic Defense Procurement, 60 Gov. Contr. 
¶ 196 (2018).
The European Defense Fund thus appears to contradict the U.S. Defense 
Department’s many reciprocal defense procurement agreements with its Euro-
pean allies. See Department of Defense, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memoranda of 
Understanding, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procure-
ment_memoranda_of_understanding.html; see DFARS DFARS 226.872. Those 
European nations, among other allies known as “qualifying” countries, gen-
erally enjoy free access to U.S. defense procurements, including for research 
and development, and in return U.S. defense firms are to enjoy reciprocal 
access to the allied countries’ defense markets. See, e.g., Christopher Yukins 
& Daniel Ramish, Feature Comment, Section 809 and ‘e-Portal’ Proposals, By 
Cutting Bid Protests In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International 
Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption,” 60 Gov. Cont. ¶ 138 (May 2, 
2018) (discussing agreements). Those reciprocal agreements to open defense 
markets have helped the United States become a leading arms provider in 
Europe, and have helped secure close cooperation in defense procurement 
between the United States and its European allies.
In light of that longstanding tradition of open and cooperative defense 
procurement across the Atlantic, the European Defense Fund seems an 
anomaly -- an oddly protectionist gambit by the European Union despite 
subdued concerns from the U.S. defense community (and others) that the 
Defense Fund violates standing requirements for open procurement. See, 
e.g., European Defence Fund Could Be Breaching European Treaties, Legal 
Opinion Says, EurActiv, Dec. 14, 2018 (“None of our initiatives, including 
the [European Defense Fund], change the procurement rules in defence in 
Europe,” Jorge Domecq, chief executive of the European Defence Agency, 
told a defence industry summit in Brussels in early December. “We hear a 
lot about this from our American allies, for example, but it is fake news.”) 
(available on Westlaw); Creating European Defence Fund Would Breach EU 
Treaty & Further Undermine Irish Neutrality, 2018 WLNR 38761983 (Sinn 
Fein Member of the European Parliament Matt Carthy “has condemned the 
vote of the European Parliament this week in favour of establishing a Euro-
pean Defence Fund (EDF), while welcoming the publication of a legal opinion 
which finds that the creation of an EDF would be in breach of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union.”) (available on Westlaw). The prog-
ress made by the European Defense Fund, and the Trump administration’s 
failure to complain, may be due to a number of factors.
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The first and most obvious is the desire of many European nations, prodded 
by President Trump, to spend more on their own defense. See, e.g., Michael 
Barnier, Europe’s Future Is Up To Us, Project Syndicate, Jan. 4, 2019; David 
M. Herszenhorn, How to Improve Europe’s Military Defense, POLITICO, Dec. 
7, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/working-group-berlin-how-to-improve-
europes-military-defense/. The European Defense Fund is intended to help 
integrate a very fragmented European defense industry, because the Fund will 
provide development funding only if the new efforts involve multiple Member 
States. While this new funding may address President Trump’s complaints 
that the European states do not spend enough on defense, limiting the new 
funding to European firms seems to contradict the reciprocal defense agree-
ments described above. That, in turn, may reflect a new assertiveness in 
European policy, an overt desire to challenge the “bullying” that Europeans 
perceive from the Trump administration in foreign trade (and defense). E.g., 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies -- Policy 
Department, Consequences of US Trade Policy on EU-US Trade relations and 
the Global Trading System (2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2018/603882/EXPO_STU(2018)603882_EN.pdf. 
But while all of that explains the Europeans’ actions, none of it explains 
why the Trump administration has offered only muted concerns about the 
European Defense Fund. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, U.S. Revives Concerns 
About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies, N.Y Times, Feb. 18, 
2018. Although that acquiescence from Washington may be due to U.S. will-
ingness to overlook European protectionism in order to encourage enhanced 
European defense spending, there may be a more fundamental obstacle to 
engagement. While the Trump administration has been very publicly engaged 
in opening foreign markets and protecting domestic industries, it has largely 
overlooked the third, diplomatic element of foreign trade: to use trade as 
leverage for stronger, more secure relationships between nations. It is that 
third aspect of foreign trade policy -- comity and cooperation -- that is directly 
threatened by the European Defense Fund’s overtly exclusionary structure. 
Having largely set aside comity and cooperation in foreign trade, however, 
the Trump administration may simply lack the voice to complain pointedly 
about the emerging European Defense Fund.
V. CONCLUSION
This past year was clearly one of flux, and the coming year may see further 
changes. President Trump may be swept up in political and legal challenges, 
which could derail his foreign trade initiatives; at the same time, though, 
those challenges may prompt his administration to redouble its protectionist 
initiatives, and to include procurement markets in those efforts. While those 
next steps are unclear, what is clear is that there are sound historical and 
empirical reasons to steer away from protectionism in procurement, and to 
reclaim the comity and cooperation that helped shape the world economic 
order in the decades after World War II -- an economic order that, until very 
recently, included progressively opening markets in procurement.
1  In his accompanying piece, Paul Lalonde discusses the USMCA from a Canadian 
perspective, and explains that the Canadian government refers to the agreement 
by the acronym “CUSMA,” for “Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement.”
